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      Beginning in 1953, radiation exposure and its effects 
became a hotly contested issue between the government, 
members of communities surrounding the Nevada Test 
Site (NTS), and researchers within the national scientific 
community. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 
concerned about maintaining a continental testing facility 
and aware that atomic testing would impact communities 
surrounding the NTS, sent representatives to areas 
potentially affected by fallout to instruct and reassure the 
affected public. How government officials perceived 
neighboring communities and how these communities 
perceived these representatives of the government often 
determined public responses to the atomic testing 
program. The story of radiation monitors and the 
communities they served is indicative of the ways in 
which Americans viewed the concepts of safety and risk 





      On May 19, 1953 the Atomic Energy Commission’s 
atomic test designated Harry detonated before dawn on 
the Nevada Proving Ground, producing a cloud of 
radioactive material which began to disburse over the 
region’s major highways and small towns east of the test 
site’s boundary. Several hundred vehicles were stopped 
on highways 91 and 93 and motorists were warned to roll 
up their windows and keep their air intakes sealed. Men 
in white coats with Geiger counters told the public that 
there was “no danger” but to stay inside their vehicle until 
they were out of the path of the radioactive cloud. Many 
of these vehicles were sent for decontamination in St. 
George or Las Vegas to free car washes funded by the 
AEC. In addition, the agency’s meteorologists had noted 
just after dawn that the radioactive cloud was headed into 
some thunderheads over St. George and issued a warning 
to residents to stay indoors from nine in the morning until 
noon to avoid any potential fallout. An AEC 
spokesperson issued a statement to the media in which he 
insisted that despite these precautionary measures, 
“radiation had not reached a hazardous level” in any of 
these areas. [1] 
      In the days and months that followed “Dirty Harry,” 
as the test was later named [Figure 1], it became 
increasingly apparent to the small population that 
surrounded the test site that there was more to the impact 
of radioactive fallout than previously considered. 
Vehicles were washed and so were clothes, but the 
hundreds of cattle and horses that were blinded or 
suffered strange burns and the thousands of sheep that 
died drew national attention to the idea of radiation 
exposure and damage through fallout. Coupled with the 
deaths of over a dozen children, who lived in 
communities surrounding the test site of leukemia 
between 1956 and 1961, and the strange burns and other 
injuries adults in the same area suffered, in hindsight to 
many community members these damages occurring a the 
same time as atmospheric testing seemed suspiciously 




Figure 1. Harry shot May 19, 1953. 
 
2. Delineating Safety during the Cold War 
 
      From 1951 to 1992, the AEC, and its later incarnation 
the Department of Energy (DOE), conducted this 
country’s atomic testing program. Situated in southern 
Nevada, approximately seventy miles north of Las Vegas, 
what became known as the Nevada Test Site hosted 
roughly half of all of the nation’s atmospheric tests and 
nearly all of its underground tests. This stark and 
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beautiful landscape essentially functioned as a scientific 
proving ground and an outdoor laboratory, yet unlike 
indoor testing facilities, the effects of atomic tests were 
not confined to the boundaries of the test site. 
Communities surrounding the NTS, though told testing 
was “safe,” were negatively affected by the products of 
the testing program, especially atmospheric disbursement 
of radioactive fallout. [2]  
      The AEC, concerned about maintaining a continental 
testing facility and aware that atomic testing would 
impact communities such as St. George in Utah and 
Caliente, Hiko, and Ely in Nevada, sent representatives to 
areas potentially affected by fallout to educate and inform 
the public. These radiation monitors were the public 
liaisons between the atomic testing program and the 
offsite communities. What they said in their official 
capacity as testing representatives with reference to the 
issue of “safety” was often interpreted by offsite 
communities to mean “no impact,” although what the 
term as used by these officials indicated was “no 
permanent damage.” The two impacts this 
miscommunication had on community members’ 
perception of atomic testing and the government were: (1) 
how different individuals in the offsite communities 
around the NTS understood the term “safety” often 
determined their responses to fallout exposure and to the 
expert officials sent to disseminate safety information and  
(2) the informal relationship built between some monitors 
and the offsite communities they served had great bearing 
on the AEC’s success in eventually communicating the 
“safety” of atomic testing. 
      In the early years of continental testing, 1951-1970, 
the AEC contracted with the Army and then the Public 
Health Service (PHS) to monitor offsite radiation—that 
which occurred beyond the boundaries of the Nellis 
Gunnery and Bombing Range—and inform the small 
rural communities surrounding the NTS of the proper 
precautions needed to avoid protracted and dangerous 
exposure to radioactive fallout. Although not mandated 
by the federal government, this early offsite monitoring 
program was part of the AEC’s efforts to ensure the 
safety of the public and secure the relatively new and 
somewhat controversial continental testing site in 
Nevada. Any community within a two hundred mile 
radius might be in the path of significant radioactive 
fallout, but the AEC’s investigative committee which set 
up the NTS had determined that the “size of the risk” of a 
continental test site was that a small population would 
receive some exposure. According to the prevailing 
scientific theory on radiation exposure, a zero level was 
not necessary to prevent harm to health. As long as the 
exposure was less than the theoretically determined safe 
level, there would be no permanent harm done. [3]  
      The collective goal of the AEC and PHS was to 
assure the “greatest health benefit of atomic energy and 
its by-products to the general public and at the same time 
the greatest protection to the public health.” Radiation 
monitoring was not only a priority for the nation’s safety, 
but a necessary tool in ensuring that Americans cooperate 
with the establishment and maintenance of a continental 
test site. Unfortunately, conditions in American society in 
the early 1950s were especially prohibitive to disclosing 
sensitive information to the public: the Soviet Union’s 
detonation of a hydrogen bomb in 1949, the trial and 
execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg for treason in 
1951, and the general paranoia produced by the McCarthy 
hearings and the Korean War inhibited the necessary flow 
of information from scientific experts to the communities 
surrounding the test site. Rather than educate and inform 
the public about what was known of the hazards of 
fallout, radiation monitors sent into offsite communities 
were more often military personnel who instead 
instructed and reassured the public. After taking Geiger 
counter readings, they merely told people there was no 
danger and advised them on decontamination procedures. 
[4]  
 
3. Differing Interpretations of Safety 
 
      When the AEC made its fourteenth annual report to 
Congress in 1953 about the year’s events, there was no 
general indication that the fallout had done any harm. 
What did not appear in the government’s report were 
accounts of thousands of sheep deaths in southwestern 
Utah. About five thousand sheep grazing on the Nevada-
Utah border directly east of the test site suffered burns, 
blindness, and death—a 30% loss of lambs and a 20% 
loss of mature sheep—during the same period as the 1953 
test series. The AEC had been asked to look into the 
sheep deaths, but their investigation culminated in a 
report in August of 1953 without making any correlation 
between fallout exposure and sheep injury. The two 
investigating veterinarians, Navy Major Robert Veenstra 
of the US Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory and the 
AEC’s investigator on the Trinity test from Los Alamos, 
Dr. Robert Tompsett, determined that there was no direct 
evidence that radiation precipitated the sheep losses. The 
causes of the reported burns and the sheep deaths were 
determined to be coincidental with the test series and the 
sheep were said to suffer from malnutrition as their 
grazing areas were particularly lean in the drought of that 
year. However, buried within the report was the opinion 
of the veterinarians Veenstra and Thompsett that there 
was a “surprisingly high concentration of radioactive 
elements which had become fixed in the thyroid tissue 
and bones” of the dead sheep. [5]  
      The impact the sheep deaths had on the AEC’s public 
relations with the communities surrounding the test site 
was profound. Although radiation monitors had been sent 
to towns such as St. George, Ely, Caliente, and Hiko, very 
little thought had been given to reaching ranchers who 
lived and ran their livestock in the vast spaces in between. 
The AEC treated the sheep men during the investigation 
as uneducated non-experts which deeply undercut the 
trust this small group of people had with their 
government. The report depicted the sheep men as 
“mostly uneducated and untrained … not capable of 
detecting trouble until the actual deaths of the animals,” 
and that as a result, no “professional” treatment had been 
given to the affected animals before their deaths 
prohibiting an exhaustive investigation. [6]  
      Ranchers from Tonopah to Ely to St. George found it 
difficult to believe that the sheep died from malnutrition. 
They found it completely incongruent for the AEC to tell 
them the testing was safe and there was no danger from 
fallout when five thousand sheep carcasses exhibited 
symptoms none of them had ever seen before: mouths 
that bled and then scarred white, wool that pulled out and 
left bald patches, burns that never healed, eyes that went 
blind, and babies born with pot bellies and stubby legs. 
Their conversations with the investigative veterinarians 
left them with the impression that their sheep had indeed 
been exposed to significant amounts of radiation and that 
their hunch had been correct. In light of the 1954 Castle 
series held in the Pacific in which a Japanese fishing boat, 
the Fortunate Dragon [Fukuru Maru], was heavily 
irradiated causing the deaths of crew members which 
made national news, it became even more plausible that 
their sheep had died from radiation exposure. The 
ranchers hired Dan Bushnell, a local attorney in St. 
George, to take the case to court, but no resolution was 
reached for decades, despite the efforts of former 
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall. The AEC’s 
response throughout the rest of the 1950s was that other 
official reports refuted and therefore invalidated the initial 
findings of the two veterinarians. [7]  
      For the ranchers nearest the test site, the Uhaldes at 
Adaven, the Sharps at Blue Eagle, the Fallinis at Twin 
Springs, and others, the AEC’s standard reassurances of 
safety became harder and harder to believe. Although 
reporter Gladwin Hill from the New York Times 
interviewed several community members in 1957 who 
were relatively unconcerned about the atomic testing 
program and thought much of the “scare talk” was just 
people wanting public attention, most in offsite 
communities felt differently. The Los Angeles Times  also 
interviewed ranchers and farmers around the NTS who 
claimed that atomic testing was a threat to their families 
and livestock. In the face of what the ranchers themselves 
witnessed, they did not believe the AEC’s claim that 
testing had not caused serious illness or injury to the 
health of livestock or residents: a rancher’s son, Martin 
Bordoli had died of leukemia, Father Ryan, a priest from 
Caliente fell ill after driving near the test site’s northern 
sector, and local highway employee Bert Wilson had 
suffered since 1955 from burns that would not heal. [8] 
      These incidents with families, and especially children, 
as well as the damage to cattle, sheep, horses, and dogs 
from burns, cancer and blindness made ranchers want the 
testing stopped. Many wondered why tests were 
postponed if the fallout cloud might head south over Las 
Vegas, but not over them. Helen Fallini, who suffered 
from eye trouble she attributed to radiation exposure, 
wondered “Why is fallout harmful if it goes over Las 
Vegas and not harmful if it comes over here?” Her father-
in-law Eugene speculated that “If fallout isn’t harmful … 
let it go wherever it wants to go.” Damage to the animals 
and the community made it difficult for people living in 
the areas surrounding the test site to “believe the 
assurances of the AEC that tests do not pose a threat to 
their health.” But the AEC continued its program of 
reassuring and instructing instead of educating and 
informing the public. [9]  
 
4. Different Meanings of Expertise 
 
      One of the most prolific forms of reassurance was the 
official guide monitors disseminated to offsite 
communities to inform them about safety measures. Many 
ranchers found it extremely patronizing. [Figure 2] The 
document singled out offsite communities by saying 
“You people who live near the Nevada Test Site are in a 
very real sense active participants in the Nation’s atomic 
test program.” The booklet congratulated them that 
although some had “been inconvenienced by our [AEC] 
test operations,” offsite communities nevertheless had 
“accepted them without fuss and without alarm.” It 
reassured them that “To our knowledge no one outside 
the test site has been hurt in six years of testing.” Offsite 
residents were told that a panel of experts in “biology and 
medicine, blast, fallout, and meteorology,” determined 
when testing took place. [10]  
      The guide provided simplified technical and scientific 
explanations of the products of atomic explosions as if the 
process was fully understood and containable. It did not, 
however, exclude the possibility of harm, just the 
probability. “Simply stated,” the booklet read, “findings 
have confirmed that Nevada test fallout has not caused 
illness or injured the health of anyone living near the test 
site [but] … Because fallout consists of small particles, it 
cannot be guaranteed that a small beta burn would never 
occur to a person living near the test site.” The work also 
reassured communities that “Test officials would not 
approve a shot if they knew that resulting fallout on any 
community would be heavy.” Communities were told that 
“If you are in an area exposed to fallout, you will be so 
advised by … radiation monitors who will explain just 
what is happening.” Gracian Uhalde remembers the little 
black book the AEC handed out to inform the public—to 




Figure 2. Drawings from Atomic Tests in Nevada. 
 
      Early radiation monitors were not able to 
communicate their reassurances effectively and ranchers 
had a difficult time accepting this information and 
cooperating with monitors’ requests. Not only did it seem 
that their version of events and definition of safety 
differed greatly from the AEC’s, but their perception of 
expertise did as well. Lina Sharp, relative of Minnie, 
thought the early field men were snotty, young kids that 
looked down on ranchers who worked in near isolation in 
the Great Basin. She said “We didn’t want to cooperate 
with them because we didn’t like their attitudes and we 
weren’t going to do anything with them.” Rather than 
viewing the radiation monitors as experts, Lina thought 
that the ranchers were “as good or better than they were 
… they were just young kids who were not very smart, 
intelligent, or anything.” Until the death of her nephew, 
the AEC had not placed any monitoring equipment 
anywhere near Helen Fallini’s ranch or any of the others. 
Because “they kept saying it wasn’t hurting us.” It was 
“just the fact,” she said, “that when we started squawking 
about letting so much of that fallout come up over us this 
way.”  [12]  
      But some monitors were better than others in the eyes 
of the offsite communities; Public Health Service monitor 
Don James is remembered well. It seemed everybody 
particularly liked Don James because, as he describes, he 
did not have all the answers and said so. Don seemed like 
a real human being to the ranchers, always happy-go-
lucky. Gracian Uhalde said he was “just there to basically 
have a good time and do whatever he could do.” Don had 
grown up in Erie, Colorado on a farm and worked at 
Rocky Flats producing detonators until 1961 when he 
moved to Las Vegas to work as a monitor at the test site. 
He developed relationships with the Fallinis, Sharps, 
Uhaldes, and many other ranching families north of the 
test site. Don said that “you can’t fool those people 
[ranchers], they’re pretty smart you know.” “We’d tell 
them everything,” he said, “we never held back on 
anything. You know of course, the DOE [said] you don’t 
say this, you don’t say that, or anything. When we were 
asked, we’d tell them … that’s what they liked … they 
didn’t appreciate people, the Army, because they 
wouldn’t say anything, and then when they did answer 





      For the ranching communities outside the test site, the 
most important message they heard from the AEC was 
that atomic testing was safe. They understood the concept 
to mean that there would be no visible impact or damage. 
Burns on livestock and especially on people and children 
dying of leukemia did not speak to the safety of atomic 
testing and radioactive fallout. Scientists on the other 
hand understood safety to mean that there would be no 
significant or permanent damage. Testing officials knew 
there would be effects of atomic testing in Nevada, 
especially in offsite communities. Although they did not 
blatantly deceive people about the effects, they certainly 
minimized their impact to the extent that when offsite 
communities were finally given the necessary information 
about he risks of atomic testing, community members felt 
they were lied to by the very government that was trying 
to protect them.  
      Historian Barton Hacker writes that the AEC’s 
decision to reassure this population that there was no 
danger and that atomic testing was safe, as opposed to 
inform them of the effects of radiation exposure, only 
served to make offsite communities suspicious and 
unhappy. “Assuming the public could not grasp” the 
differences between “minor versus major risk, the AEC 
preferred to claim no risk at all.” Yet it would be a 
mistake to think that the AEC simply did not care about 
the impact of fallout on offsite communities. Richard 
Miller explains that the agency was consistently torn 
between guarding and divulging information to the public 
that could either harm or support their mission. According 
to Paul Boyer, despite “a disinformation campaign by 
federal officials pooh-pooing the health hazards of 
radioactivity,” concerned scientists and the public at large 
“became deeply alarmed.” Geneticists, he writes, claimed 
that “the concept of a safe rate of radiation simply does 
not make sense,” that “there is no such thing as a safe 
dose of radiation to the population.” But Dr. Shields 
Warren of the AEC summed up the situation, writing that 
from the AEC’s perspective, genetic risk from radioactive 
fallout was “so slight in relation to other risks as to be 
disregarded.” [14] 
      Some of those other risks included the perception of 
damage by the public, whether actual or not, the threat of 
closure of the Nevada Test Site, and America’s loss in the 
arms race. It was easier for the AEC to not to explain the 
intricacies of radiation exposure when the subject was 
heavily contested within the scientific community and 
could ultimate lead to loosing the Cold War. By the end 
of atmospheric testing, public opinion surrounding the 
test site was persistently negative. And yet, the informal 
relationships radiation monitors like Don James 
developed with the Uhaldes, Fallinis, Sharps and other 
ranching families served to reestablish a basis of trust 
previously lost between the government and the offsite 
communities. Through these informal relationships, 
information and mutual respect were exchanged and very 
few of the communities surrounding the test site, in the 
end, did not support their government.  
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